Naval War College Review
Volume 58
Number 3 Summer

Article 18

2005

To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped
the World,
Paul William Garber

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Garber, Paul William (2005) "To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the World,," Naval War College Review: Vol. 58 : No. 3
, Article 18.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/18

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

152

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Garber: To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the World,

principal instrument whereby God works
these good things to thee.”
Herman, Arthur. To Rule the Waves: How the
British Navy Shaped the World. New York:
HarperCollins, 2004. 648pp. $26.95

The subtitle of Arthur Herman’s grand
maritime history To Rule the Waves
gives it all away: How the British Navy
Shaped the World. Through a series of
well-described episodes, Herman convincingly discusses how the Royal Navy
came to dominate the seas and sustained Britain’s ability to expand and
maintain its empire.
From John Hawkins and Francis Drake
to the amazingly named Cloudsley
Shovell, as well as Horatio Nelson, John
Fisher, David Beatty, and the like,
Herman traces the development of
men, ships, and strategies, and the technologies that forced change.
The initial impulse for trade was
matched by a desire for plunder, so that
the relationship that later developed between the navy and the merchant trade
required maturation. John Dee, writing
a memorial to Queen Elizabeth in 1577,
proposed a permanent navy as the
“master key wherewith to open all locks
that keep out or hinder this incomparable British empire.” Although the queen
lacked the means, the idea never really
died. John Holland, not quoted by
Herman, wrote in his 1638 “Discourse
of the Navy”: “If either the honour of a
nation, commerce, or trade with all nations, peace at home, grounded upon
our enemies’ fear or love of us abroad,
and attended with plenty of all things
necessary either for the preservation for
the public need, or thy private welfare,
be things worthy thy esteem . . . then
next to God and the King, give thy
thanks for the same to the navy, as the
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And nothing has changed.
This is a good book that describes all
the twists and turns necessary for a nation to become a great commercial
power and to protect itself from substantial competition and extraordinary
technological challenges. What Herman
establishes clearly is that ultimately it
was the will to develop a navy and the
willingness to use it in the most courageous manner, whether as a matter
of policy or as a commander’s individual initiative, that effectively supported the realm.
Unfortunately, Herman is not as well
supported by his publisher. There are
numerous editorial lapses in grammar
and proofreading, and although substantive factual errors are few, there are
enough to be annoying. For example,
the assertion that the average Britisher
consumed four pounds of sugar a day
in 1700 and twelve pounds a day in
1720 should actually read “per year.”
Saint Michel should read Saint Mihiel.
It is Saint Nazaire, not Nizaire, and
Veinticinco, not Veinticino. There is
also the omission of Port Stanley as a
principal town in the Falklands, and the
incorrect statement that “from [Prince]
Alfred on, every generation of the royal
family would make sure someone carried
on the navy tradition, King George V and
Louis Mountbatten being the most famous and Prince Philip the most recent” would leave Prince Charles and
Prince Andrew wondering where they
fit in. In citing the Falklands campaign,
Herman also mentions what we in Naval Control of Shipping refer to as
“ships taken up from trade.” It is worth
mentioning that without adequate auxiliaries a navy may be at risk and that
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without a controllable merchant marine, a nation may be at risk.
Herman rightly celebrates the daring
and enterprise of British naval officers
and their willingness to use the means
at hand to achieve their goals. A fleet in
being is useless if not backed up by the
commitment to use it. The problem
was, as always, how to pay for the navy,
which Herman cites as the major cause
of Britain’s civil war in 1642. The same
issue faces us in 2005.
PAUL WILLIAM GARBER

Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve, Retired

Stevens, David, ed. The Royal Australian Navy in
World War II. 2d ed. Australia: Allen & Unwin,
2005. 336pp. AUD$39.95

Australia is quintessentially a maritime
nation. From the arrival of Lieutenant
James Cook, RN, in Botany Bay in 1770,
navies have featured heavily in the historical experience of Australia, and for
this naval officer, the navy is rightfully
regarded as “the senior service.” Given
this background, it seems surprising
that there is not more written about
this naval tradition and especially about
the triumphs and tragedies of the Royal
Australian Navy (RAN) in wartime. The
recent publication of a second edition of
David Stevens’s Royal Australian Navy
in World War II fills a very important
gap. First published in 1996, the book
has been augmented significantly in this
new edition.
David Stevens is a former naval officer,
a graduate of the University of New
South Wales and Australian National
University, and currently director of
Strategic and Historical Studies within
the Sea Power Centre–Australia. He
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brings a critical and experienced eye
to his editorship, and this is reflected
in the many changes made in this edition. This book has a new cover, new
photographs, six new chapters, and
substantial updates to all preexisting
chapters, with an increase of over a
hundred pages. This work eschews any
single theme but rather seeks to encapsulate an eclectic array of approaches
to the general topic. While initially
disconcerting, this methodology is
skillfully used and provides a holistic
account of the RAN wartime
experience.
The chapters deal with, inter alia, matters of grand policy concerning Australian naval strategizing in the lead-up to
the war, interesting accounts of battles
experienced by former crew members,
an outline of regional confrontation
with Vichy French representatives, social assessments of the officer corps and
female participation in the naval service, and a description of industrial reorganization within Australia, as well as
accounts of naval operational thinking
and planning during the course of the
war. By any measure, the achievements
of the RAN during the conflict were astonishing. At the war’s close, the RAN
comprised 337 ships and over forty
thousand mobilized personnel. The
navy served in almost every theater of
that global war and earned its fair share
of battle glory. As James Goldrick notes
in chapter 1, the RAN had been involved in the sinking of numerous enemy capital ships and submarines, the
destruction of over a hundred enemy
aircraft and over 150,000 tons of axis
merchant shipping. Perhaps the
RAN’s most significant achievement
was its ability to keep open sea lines
of communication to Australia at a
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